The Makkah Pact: The New Game in Town

The bigger story is that a self-reliant, regionally driven security architecture is the new game in town. When global collective security is weakened, and the external security umbrella is insufficient, regional collective defence mechanisms move into the space. Add a diluted superpower and asymmetric dependence to the mix, and alternatives will emerge. They are emerging. The Makkah Pact is one such alternative.

On 7 August 2026, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. The agreement extends the logic of collective defence to the trilateral relationship. An armed attack on any one of the three shall be regarded as an armed attack on all. From bilateral to trilateral. It is largely seen as defensive in nature.

The significance of the trilateral arrangement lies in what the three countries bring to the table. Saudi Arabia brings economic weight, strategic geography and enormous influence in the Muslim and Arab world; Türkiye brings military capability, defence-industrial capacity and NATO experience. Pakistan brings expertise on the ground and long experience of serving in the Middle East and nuclear deterrence. That is a formidable combination. For decades, the security of the Gulf was deeply tied to the American security umbrella. That relationship has not disappeared. Nor is Saudi Arabia abandoning Washington. But the Gulf states are increasingly hedging. They are diversifying their strategic options.

The wars in the region have demonstrated that wealth does not automatically translate into security. Advanced weapons do not necessarily provide strategic autonomy. And external guarantees are only as credible as the willingness and ability of the guarantor to deliver. This is where this Pact comes in. Pakistan’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is not new. What is changing is its strategic context. Pakistan is no longer just balancing. It is hedging under fire and emerging as a guarantor. The responsibility for security is shifting to the regions and the middle powers, which are seeking security architectures that do not compromise strategic autonomy.

Egypt is not a part of the trilateral arrangement although it was a crucial part of the initial conversation and looked like a natural fit. It has one of the region’s largest militaries, strategic geography, considerable Arab influence and longstanding security relationships with Saudi Arabia. So why did Cairo stay out? The answer lies in its highly sensitive relationship with Israel. It is also a US ally, a neighbour of Israel and the first Arab country to establish full diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. Any decision to join a collective defence arrangement involving Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan would therefore require Cairo to reassess its foreign policy calculus. Staying outside the Makkah framework gives it some breathing room for now.

The current arrangement should be seen as the foundation layer of a larger architecture. The Makkah Pact does not have to include everyone on day one. It needs to establish credibility first. Others can follow.

The Iran factor cannot be subtracted from the discussion. Tehran has given mixed signals, settling down on the official version of it not being a threat to Iran. Interestingly, the Makkah Pact has already produced its first counter-alliance. India and Israel will perhaps converge more. It is being read in Jerusalem and New Delhi as a strategic realignment which may work against them. Israel has consistently worked to sabotage any peace deal materializing between Iran and the US. The Gaza and Lebanon war has exposed the limits of Washington’s ability to restrain its closest regional ally. Israel has repeatedly demonstrated that it will pursue what it considers its strategic objectives even when those actions create serious political and diplomatic repercussions for the United States. If Washington cannot fully restrain its closest regional ally, it cannot sustain this military adventurism without its support, which alters the confidence of US allies in the region.

The problem for Washington is not simply Israel. It is credibility. The United States remains the world’s most powerful military power. But power is not the same thing as influence. Influence depends on the ability to shape outcomes. And when regional actors begin to believe that Washington cannot or will not shape the outcomes that matter to them, they will look elsewhere. Israel and the US have already suffered a strategic and PR defeat. The conventional military defeat may not be far behind. Iran, despite having a weak hand, has played really well.

The world is moving towards a more fragmented international system. Great power competition is intensifying. Regional conflicts are multiplying. Traditional alliances are being tested. The credibility of external security guarantees is being questioned. And middle powers are responding. This is not a return to the old Cold War. It is something more complicated, often referred to as ‘multiplexity’.

The Makkah Pact also has the US blessing. It represents the kind of burden-sharing that President Trump has repeatedly called for. Many also see it as a restraint both on Israel and Iran. To the skeptics of the Makkah Pact, Pakistan, round and square, is a critical part of the emerging global order of middle powers taking over and calling the shots. Pakistan’s relevance is no longer confined to South Asia. Its geography places it at the intersection of South Asia, Central Asia, China, Afghanistan and the Gulf. Its relationship with China and the US adds another strategic dimension. Its nuclear capability, military capacity and longstanding defence relationships with the Gulf give it a role that few other middle powers can replicate.

Pakistan is acquiring several hats from mediator, to a stakeholder on the table to a guarantor and security provider beyond the region. But strategic relevance comes with responsibility. The old security architecture is under stress. The superpower remains powerful, but its ability to guarantee outcomes is increasingly diluted. Regional conflicts are spilling across borders. Traditional alliances are being tested. Israel’s actions are creating consequences that even Washington finds difficult to contain.

The middle powers are responding. They want security without surrendering strategic autonomy. They want partnerships that reflect their national interests rather than simply serving the priorities of distant powers. The Makkah Pact is the first concrete expression of that instinct. It is not the finished architecture. It is the beginning of one. And Pakistan is not watching this transformation from the sidelines. Pakistan is on the table.