The Trump Taiwan Two-Step Tango

South Korea is not a happy country. It was unwilling to help Team Trump keep the Strait of Hormuz open. So, the petulant president decided it was time to rekindle the love affair with the North’s dictator Kim Jung Un and punish the South by cutting off joint exercises. One wonders if the logical consequence will be the South’s acquisition of nuclear weapons as it can no longer trust the Trump administration to honour its defence commitments to Seoul.

How ironic. Trump is determined to prevent Iran, with its dictatorial rule, from obtaining nuclear weapons. Yet, despite having come close to war with North Korea to stop Pyongyang from going nuclear in the first term, guess what? Trump is hoping for help from Kim.

The question: is North Korea or Iran the better place to live given the harshness of the political systems in both states; and given no choice, which country would be preferable? Quite a dilemma.

What happens when China’s President Xi Jingping meets with President Trump next month? Suppose a Trump Taiwan two-step tango takes place and Trump decides there is no reason for the US to go to war or defend Taiwan. Should China make good on its promise to achieve one China? Trump’s argument could be this.

For much of the Cold War, the US maintained the capability to wage war to defend NATO at the conventional and nuclear levels for which it maintained substantial tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons and strategic forces through its bomber, ballistic submarine and land-based missiles.

Before starting the ill-advised war with Iran, about two-thirds of Americans would not support going to war over Taiwan. After the bungled Iran “excursion,” surely far more Americans would oppose a war with China. And the internal politics of Taiwan reinforce that preference.

Taiwan has the resources to create a “Porcupine Defence” that would make any invasion very costly and thus unlikely. But that is not the case. Taiwan still depends on the US for its ultimate defence.

Of the 113 seats in the Yuan, Taiwan’s Parliament, 52 are held by the Kuomintang (KMT) that supports some form of reconciliation with the mainland; 51 by the DPP that wishes to remain separate; and 10 other seats. That is one reason why a full Porcupine Defence has not been implemented. And China probably is taking the long view that at some stage Taiwan will choose to become amalgamated into one China.

Trump could expedite that process by working out a deal with Xi along the lines he may negotiate a modus operandi with Kim. In that case, the US would not be prepared or required to defend Taiwan if Xi gives a promise or commitment not to invade and perhaps help to resolve the war with Iran. That would greatly ease the demands on the US military.

The US National Defence Strategy (NDS) sets as a top priority: Deter China in the Indo-Pacific Through Strength, Not Confrontation with a “Sea Denial” strategy to prevent access to the First Island Chain (FIC). The strategic reality is that China has set up a powerful anti-area, anti-access denial (A2AD) perimeter. With its longest-range missiles and aviation units, the so-called Weapons Engagement Zone or WEZ extends over 1500 miles from China’s borders.

In unclassified war games, this WEZ holds any surface forces at sea and ashore at substantial risk meaning that taking high casualties is quite possible in a conflict. But the US has a better alternative than the NDS demands. For much of the Cold War, the US maintained the capability to wage war to defend NATO at the conventional and nuclear levels for which it maintained substantial tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons and strategic forces through its bomber, ballistic submarine and land-based missiles. Trump could state as his insurance policy, should China break any commitment it may make not to attack Taiwan, the US had both the conventional and nuclear forces to make any invasion a disaster. While the analogy with NATO lacks the Article 5 commitment that “an attack against one shall be considered an attack against all,” the threat should suffice to keep China from making a big mistake.

From Trump’s perspective, this would be a trifecta. Whether North Korea and China would help allow him to extricate himself from Iran, that could occur. While this approach may not alter the war in Ukraine, it would permit Trump to defuse potential tensions in Korea; alter the commitment to Taiwan; and improve US-China relations.

Not bad if Trump can execute this Taiwan two-step tango. But one should not bet the future on it. Successful execution of policy has not been the Trump administration’s finest hour.